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In 1936 Keynes’s General Theory explained how fiscal and monetary policy could be 
used to end depressions.  Since that time no developed country has ever seen a downturn on the 
scale of the 1930s.  The General Theory was not just a how-to book on the avoidance of 
depressions.  It was an argument for stabilization policy itself.  
  The years since The General Theory have seen a revolt against Keynesian economics.  In 
a revisionist mode, Milton Friedman argued that countercyclical policy cannot affect the average 
level of unemployment and output.  Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent (1979) went further, 
contending that it is not only impossible to increase average output; it is also impossible to 
stabilize it.  More recently, Lucas (1987, 2003) has argued that policies to stabilize output, even 
if effective, would yield negligible welfare gains.  Thus, stabilization policy should not be a 
macroeconomic priority. 
  Lucas’s conclusion notwithstanding, stabilization policy has long been an explicit or 
implicit objective of monetary policy in most industrial countries, even including those countries 
with inflation targets.  The volatility of output has, in fact, declined in most major industrial 
countries since the mid-1980s, and monetary policy arguably deserves at least partial credit.
1  
Mirroring practice, monetary policy research commonly takes it as “given” that, along with price 
stability, stabilization policy—the minimization of squared deviations of output around 
potential—is an appropriate policy objective.
2  In this paper we explore the economic rationale 
for stabilization as a policy goal, concluding that it does, in fact, deserve high policy priority.  
We survey a large body of literature that critiques the validity of key assumptions in Lucas’s 
argument.  We also offer suggestive evidence that stabilization policy can significantly reduce 
                                                 
1 See Bernanke (2004). 
 
2 See, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).   2
average levels of unemployment by providing stimulus to demand in circumstances where 
unemployment is high but underutilization of labor and capital does little to lower inflation.   A 
monetary policy that vigorously fights high unemployment should, however, also be 
complemented by a policy that equally vigorously fights inflation when it rises above a modest 
target level.   The Federal Reserve Act thus wisely enunciated price stability and maximum 
employment as twin goals for monetary policy.    
 
II.  The Case Against Stabilization Policy 
Macroeconomic analysis typically assumes that social welfare depends negatively on 
both inflation (above a modest target level, here assumed zero) and unemployment (above some 
minimum, socially efficient level).  For example, a standard social welfare function is the 
discounted sum of period losses (Lt) of the form:
3 
(1)                    
22 (( 1 ) * ) tt t La u k u b π =− − + , 
where  t u and  t π  are the unemployment and inflation rates in period t, and  * u  is the natural rate 
of unemployment.  The coefficient k is positive, reflecting the desirability of unemployment 
below the natural rate.  Because real economies deviate in many respects from perfect 
competition, the natural rate of unemployment is likely to exceed the socially optimal 
unemployment rate.   For example, with monopolistic competition, goods are underproduced 
because they are priced above marginal cost, so “potential output” is inefficiently low and 
“equilibrium unemployment” is too high.   
  Standard macroeconomic analysis additionally assumes that inflation is determined by an 
expectations-augmented, accelerationist Phillips curve of the form 
                                                 
3 See among others Barro and Gordon (1983, pp. 592-3).   3
(2)      ( *)
e
tt t t fu u π πε =− − +  , 
where 
e
t π is the expected inflation rate at time t (with expectations formed at  1 − t ), and  t ε  
captures supply shocks to the Phillips curve at t.  Reflecting the inflationary effects of tighter 
labor markets,  ' f  is positive; reflecting the definition of u*, the natural rate of unemployment, 
as the rate of unemployment where actual and expected inflation match,  (0) f  is equal to zero.  
In this formulation  * u  is the unique unemployment rate where inflation is stable.  This Phillips 
curve has the property that inflation rises (the price level accelerates) when u is below u*:  since 
actual inflation exceeds expected inflation, with adaptive expectations, inflation expectations rise 
over time and are factored into wage and price setting.  In contrast, when unemployment exceeds 
the natural rate, actual inflation falls short of expected inflation, so inflation declines over time as 
expectations adjust downward toward reality.  With chronic high unemployment, deflation is 
inevitable.    
  To reach the conclusion that the gains from stabilizing output are trivially small, Lucas 
considers a representative agent with a stochastic consumption stream whose welfare is given by 
the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities, which depend only on consumption and are 
characterized by constant relative risk aversion.  Thus, welfare is 















⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
∑  , 
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, andρ  is the subjective discount rate.   
Lucas shows that the gain from eliminating consumption volatility, measured as a 
fraction of average consumption, is approximately 
2 1
2
γσ , where σ
2 is the variance of the log of 
consumption about its trend.  For values of γ commonly used by researchers, the welfare gain   4
from eliminating consumption volatility of the magnitude experienced in the United States 
during the postwar period would be minuscule—on the order of one-twentieth of a percent of 
average consumption.
4    This result is not surprising.  With differentiable utility it takes large 
variations in most variables to have significant effects on welfare, and the percentage variation in 
consumption over the business cycle is now small.
5     
  Lucas’s calculation of very low returns from further stabilization of output results from 
four separate assumptions regarding the nature of the macroeconomic loss function (1) and the 
Phillips curve (2).
6  
  First, Lucas’s assessment of the potential gains from stabilizing consumption ignores 
possible relationships between the volatility of output and the volatility of inflation, captured in 
the term 
2
t bπ  in the standard loss function.  Policies to stabilize unemployment (and 
consumption) in the face of aggregate demand shocks simultaneously mitigate inflation volatility 
according to (2), conferring welfare benefits beyond those assessed by Lucas.
7  In contrast, 
stabilizing unemployment (and consumption) in the face of supply shocks entails a policy 
tradeoff between the volatility of inflation and unemployment (consumption).   In this paper we 
follow Lucas in ignoring the impacts of stabilization policy on inflation volatility.   
                                                 
4 See Lucas (2003), p. 4.  Lucas notes that values of γ between 1 and 4 are commonly used in macroeconomics and 
public finance applications.   Lucas’s baseline calculation assumes σ
  = 0.032 and γ =1, corresponding to log utility.   
 
5 The losses also rise with the degree of risk aversion. 
    
6 Romer (2001) provides an excellent discussion of the assumptions underlying Lucas’s findings and the 
implications of Lucas’s argument.  In the tradition of modern macroeconomics textbooks, however, Romer fails to 
mention the possibility that the long-run Phillips curve may not always and everywhere be vertical, as emphasized in 
this paper. 
 
7 Although it is commonly assumed, as in (1), that social welfare depends on both the mean and variance of 
inflation, the nature of the losses due to inflation volatility are not well understood.   See Woodford (2002) for an 
interesting discussion.   5
Second, by considering paths of consumption that differ only in their volatility, Lucas 
implicitly assumes that the Phillips curve is linear in unemployment.  With a linear 
accelerationist Phillips curve, average unemployment is identical along all unemployment paths 
with the same initial and final inflation.  Assuming further that unemployment is just an index 
for consumption and varies linearly with it, stabilization policy can affect the volatility of 
consumption, but not its mean, as Lucas assumes.    
If the short-run Phillips curve (the f(  ) function in (2)) is nonlinear, however, paths of 
unemployment with the same beginning and ending inflation rate will differ somewhat in their 
average unemployment rates.  If f(u-u*) is concave, paths with lower unemployment volatility 
will also enjoy lower average unemployment, higher average output, and higher average 
consumption, contrary to Lucas’s assumption.   
Lucas’s third assumption relates to the degree of nonlinearity of the function (1) relating 
social welfare to unemployment.  The loss due to consumption volatility is trivially small in part 
because values of the rate of relative risk aversion Lucas considers plausible imply only very 
modest curvature—thus, effective linearity—of the representative agent’s instantaneous utility 
function.
8  However, significant nonlinearity with respect to unemployment in the social welfare 
function could reflect extreme losses in income for a small fraction of the population due to very 
long spells of non-employment when unemployment is high, as well as substantially different 
values of leisure for the marginally employed person in booms and troughs.
9   
                                                 
8  Lucas notes that the losses due to consumption volatility are an order of magnitude higher using the far higher 
estimates of the degree of risk aversion needed to explain the equity premium puzzle.  See, for example, Tallarini 
(2000), and Alvarez and Jermann (2000).  However, as Lucas notes, not all volatility can be eliminated by 
stabilization policy, and not all risk aversion relates to business cycle fluctuations. 
 
9 Lucas’s use of the representative agent framework assumes in addition that households are identical and individual 
risk is diversifiable.     6
Finally, Lucas’s calculation relies on the assumption that the Phillips curve is 
accelerationist so that expected inflation impacts current inflation with a coefficient of unity.   
Such an assumption is now considered standard and is surprisingly well-accepted: if all wage and 
price setters are rational, the coefficient on expected inflation “should be” one.  However, 
assuming, even wishing, that wage setters and price setters are fully rational does not 
automatically make it so.  As we argue below, wage and price setters have their own ideas, 
which led Irving Fisher (1928) to deplore their lack of rationality.  If the coefficient on expected 
inflation in wage or price equations is less than unity when inflation is low and unemployment is 
high, policies to combat unemployment will reduce average levels of unemployment.   
In ensuing sections, we examine the sensitivity of Lucas’s conclusion to reasonable 
alterations in assumptions concerning the linearity of the loss function (1) and the nature of the 
Phillips curve (2).  Section III examines possible reasons why near-linearity of the loss function 
may be violated.  Section IV examines the extent to which nonlinearity of the short-run Phillips 
curve creates a meaningful role for stabilization policy.  Finally, Section V examines the 
possibility that the accelerationist Phillips curve simply fails to fit the facts: it reviews evidence 
suggesting that in long recessions, when inflation is low and unemployment is high, the Phillips 
curve coefficient on expected inflation is considerably less than unity.   
 
III. Nonlinearity in the Social Welfare Function 
 
  We have reviewed the logic behind Lucas’s finding that the losses from volatility in 
unemployment over the business cycle are likely to be small.  There are several reasons why 
Lucas’s calculation may overestimate these losses.  However, these upside biases are probably 
overshadowed by downward biases due to nonlinearity in the function relating welfare to 
unemployment.     7
Modest as they are, there are two separate reasons why Lucas’s estimate of the potential 
gains from stabilization policy could still be too high.   First, smoothing of output and 
employment over the business cycle may not result in much additional consumption smoothing if 
consumers follow the life-cycle hypothesis.  If rational consumers already smooth consumption 
in response to transitory income shocks, a systematic policy to stabilize output might result in 
little additional consumption smoothing.     
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) have advanced a more subtle argument why welfare could be 
independent of output volatility.   A simple version of their argument supposes that consumers 
experience only two states, employed and unemployed.  When unemployed, individuals have 
low consumption and low utility (UL) ; when employed, they enjoy high consumption and high 
utility (UH).  Expected utility is simply a weighted average of the high- and low-utility values, UL 
and UH,  with the weights equal to the numbers of weeks spent employed and unemployed.   In 
this formulation, stabilization of aggregate unemployment (or aggregate output) leaves welfare 
unchanged because aggregate utility depends only on the aggregate number of employment and 
unemployment weeks, numbers that should be totally unchanged by an alteration in the time 
profile of aggregate unemployment that leaves mean unemployment unchanged.   As Romer
10 
points out, Atkeson and Phelan’s argument provides a justification for linearity in the 
relationship between social welfare and unemployment.   An increase in the variance of 
unemployment in the Atkeson-Phelan model has the sole effect of increasing the correlation in 
unemployment risk across individuals.  When unemployment is more variable, individuals are 
more likely to be unemployed when others are also unemployed and to be employed when others 
are also employed.  Neither source of overestimate matters much to Lucas’s assessment of the 
benefits of stabilization policy since it is so very low to begin with.    
                                                 
10 See Romer (2001), p. 495.   8
We next turn to several reasons why welfare may depend nonlinearly on unemployment, 
suggesting losses from output volatility that are higher than Lucas’s assessment.   The first 
possibility is that the severity of an “unemployment” week rises (UL falls), while the utility of an 
“employment week” increases (UH rises), as aggregate unemployment increases.  Atkeson and 
Phelan assume, in contrast, that the utility of an employment/unemployment week is independent 
of aggregate unemployment.  But unemployment is arguably worse when it is higher and 
employment arguably less beneficial when unemployment is low.   If so, the benefits from 
stabilizing output could be far larger than Lucas estimates.   
  One reason that unemployment weeks may impose greater hardship during periods of 
high unemployment is that they disproportionately occur in unemployment spells of long 
duration.   If a week of unemployment is worse when it is experienced as part of a longer spell, 
and the share of long-duration unemployment in total unemployment rises with the aggregate 
unemployment rate, then welfare declines nonlinearly, not linearly, as unemployment rises.  
With higher unemployment, the average severity of unemployment weeks rises.   Several recent 
papers suggest reasons why long-term unemployment may be especially bad.  For example, 
Chetty (2004) argues that long-duration unemployment is especially costly for those who have 
made fixed financial commitments, for example, to buy a house.  They may have to curtail 
consumption drastically or give up such a commitment.  Carroll (1992) has emphasized that the 
unemployed may have especially low incomes, which means that with unemployment of long 
duration they have to make especially deep cuts in consumption.  Carroll finds a small, but 
nevertheless significant, fraction of his sample with very large cuts in annual income.
11   
                                                 
11 Imrohoğlu (1989),  Krusell and Smith (2002) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001) have used calibrated 
models to simulate the impact of a reduction in business cycle volatility under the assumption that consumers are 
unable to insure fully against idiosyncratic employment risk.  The welfare costs of the business cycle, on average 
and for low-income, liquidity-constrained households, depend in part on the relationship between aggregate   9
Table 1 reports the results of our attempt to determine whether long-duration spells of 
unemployment rise disproportionately with aggregate unemployment for a sample of OECD 
countries.  The table reports (first-differenced) regressions relating the fraction of unemployment 
occurring in long spells of at least 6 months (or one year) to the aggregate unemployment rate.  
We included all six countries in the OECD labor force statistics database with at least 20 years of 
annual data.  In support of the “nonlinearity hypothesis,” the incidence of long-duration 
unemployment rises significantly with the aggregate unemployment rate for Australia, Canada, 
Sweden, and the United States.   The relationship is positive but insignificant for Japan and 
nonexistent for France.
12   
  The obverse side of the Atkeson-Phelan argument is that the utility of employment may 
differ in good and bad times.  In good times, with low unemployment, the marginal employee 
may be close to indifferent between work and leisure—induced into the labor market by 
overtime pay and extra perks.  In contrast, the marginal employment opportunity in bad times 
may yield a sizable welfare surplus, as firms draw from the pool of laborers those who are 
especially anxious for a job.  Following Ball and Romer (1990), Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido 
                                                                                                                                                             
volatility and individual employment and income volatility.  Krusell and Smith find that low-income, liquidity-
constrained households would enjoy a gain equivalent to about a 4% increase in average consumption from the 
elimination of business cycle volatility. Their calculation assumes that a reduction in aggregate volatility also lowers 
individual variability.  Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron find that idiosyncratic risk varies countercyclically, 
amplifying the cost of aggregate volatility.  They estimate average welfare gains from eliminating volatility 
amounting to about 2.5% of consumption--an order of magnitude larger than Lucas. 
   
12  A large number of studies have documented the procyclical character of labor market outcomes, including 
outcomes for disadvantaged groups.   See, for example, Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger (2001).  We examined a variety 
of different labor market and socioeconomic indicators of “distress,” in addition to long-duration unemployment for 
the United States, for evidence that outcomes vary more than linearly with unemployment.  With the exception of 
mean family income at the 20th percentile of the income distribution, most measures, such as the poverty rate, 
median real family income, the Gini coeffiecient of income inequality, real hourly earnings, and average weekly 
hours, do not appear to vary nonlinearly with aggregate unemployment.  Crime is also a measure of low welfare, 
which arguably might vary more than linearly over the business cycle.  But Freeman (1994, pp. 8-12) finds only 
lukewarm evidence of a time series relation between unemployment and crime.  Such a relation has been rendered 
difficult to find because crime rates have also experienced very large shifts, both up and down, over time.   
   10
(2002) have formalized the preceding argument.  In their model, the first-best level of 
employment (and output) exceeds the economy’s steady-state employment (and output) level.  
During booms, the economy comes closer to the optimum, while in contractions, the economy 
moves even further away.  Marginal increases in employment thus result in decreasing gains.  
The last hired are likely either to need the most enticement to be in the labor force, or, 
alternatively, they are likely to be the least productive.  The function relating social welfare to 
employment is nonlinear.  Thus, the welfare cost of above-average unemployment during a 
business-cycle downturn exceeds the welfare gain from a symmetric period of below-average 
unemployment during a business-cycle expansion.  The net welfare loss from business cycle 
fluctuations is highly sensitive to the assumed elasticities of labor supply and demand.  For 
plausible parameter values Galí et al. find that the welfare cost of the business cycle is an order 
of magnitude larger than Lucas estimates.  For their preferred parameter values, the cost is 
estimated at about 1.35% of consumption.
13   
  To summarize, evidence of nonlinear variation between long-duration unemployment 
spells and the aggregate unemployment rate suggests that weeks of unemployment are likely to 
be more onerous in a trough than in a boom.  Employment is correspondingly more beneficial in 
a bust than in a boom.  Estimates of the welfare losses from the business cycle due to this latter 
effect alone are an order of magnitude greater than Lucas’s estimate of the cost of business-cycle 
volatility in consumption to representative-agent consumers.  We are beginning to identify losses 
from business cycle volatility that, while not huge, are still not to be sneezed at. 
  It is worth mentioning another methodologically ingenious attempt to measure the loss in 
welfare due to business cycle volatility using subjective satisfaction measures.  Wolfers (2003) 
analyzed responses from the Eurobarometer survey to the question “Taking things altogether, are 
                                                 
13 See Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2002), p.  17.   11
you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you 
lead?”   The survey covers 16 countries from 1973 to 1988.   Wolfers regressed alternative 
measures of life satisfaction on a country’s average unemployment and inflation rates and the 
standard deviations of unemployment and inflation during the previous eight years.  He finds that 
unemployment volatility undermines well-being significantly.  Wolfers also tested directly for 
nonlinearities in the relationship between life satisfaction and unemployment and inflation by the 
inclusion of quadratic terms, finding strong evidence of significant nonlinearity in the 
satisfaction-unemployment relationship.  However, the welfare benefits of reducing volatility are 
subject to rapidly diminishing returns.  Thus, eliminating the remaining unemployment volatility 
in Wolfers’s sample of countries would result in gains equivalent to only about a ¼ point 
reduction in the unemployment rate—large relative to Lucas’s estimate but much smaller than 
the estimate of Galí et al.   More research is needed to check the robustness of this clever 
methodology.  
 
IV.  Nonlinearity in the Phillips Curve 
In the most standard form of the accelerationist Phillips curve, current inflation varies 
linearly with unemployment.  In terms of equation (2), the function f(  ) is linear so that the 
Phillips curve takes the form   
(4)         () *
e
tt t t uu π πβ ε =− − + .   
In the United States, β is commonly estimated to be about ½, so, as a rule of thumb, a one 
percentage point rise in the unemployment rate, maintained for one year, decreases inflation by 
about ½ percentage point.    12
  The assumption of linearity of the Phillips curve has implications for the desirability of 
countercyclical policy.  If the Phillips curve is convex, rather than linear, the change in inflation 
over any interval of time depends not only on average unemployment over the interval but also 
on the volatility in unemployment.  For paths characterized by constant expected inflation, 
convexity yields an inverse relationship between the mean level of unemployment and the 
volatility of unemployment.  When unemployment is more stable, average unemployment can be 
at least somewhat smaller.  With a convex short-run Phillips curve, stabilization policy may thus 
lower average unemployment.    
  The evidence in favor of nonlinearity of the Phillips curve is reasonably strong.   Phillips 
(1958), for example, chose an f(  ) function of the form 
1
t u
α β +   to characterize data for Great 
Britain, not for theoretical reasons, but because it was most consistent with  his plots of wage 
inflation and unemployment for the years 1861 to 1957.  These graphs showed that as 
unemployment fell toward zero, inflation could reach very high levels; at times of high 
unemployment, wage inflation could become negative, but for the most part inflation “bottomed 
out” in the face of high unemployment.  Lipsey’s follow-up paper (1960) provides a theoretical 
rationale for such nonlinearity.  Lipsey argued that wage inflation would not be linear in the 
unemployment rate even if the rate of change in wages is linear in the gap between supply and 
demand for labor.  The reason is that the unemployment rate reflects the fraction of the labor 
force searching for jobs, not the excess demand for labor; the relation between unemployment 
and wage inflation is inherently nonlinear because, as the excess demand for labor becomes very 
large, wage inflation would rise in proportion, but unemployment, which indexes the number of   13
workers who are searching for jobs but do not find them, can only go to zero.
14  Other possible 
reasons for nonlinearity of the Phillips curve include menu costs of changing prices, 
misperceptions, and monopolistic competition (see Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998) for a survey).  
Downward rigidity of nominal wages is another potential cause of nonlinearity in the short-run 
Phillips curve.   We discuss this topic at considerable length below, since nominal wage 
stickiness not only makes the f(  ) function nonlinear but it may also reduce the coefficient on 
expected inflation below unity, so that the Phillips curve is no longer accelerationist (see Tobin 
(1972), Fortin (1996), Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996)).
15 
  Laxton, Rose, and Tambakis (1999) show that tests to discriminate among alternative 
functional forms of the Phillips curve suffer from extremely low power, making reliable 
assessment of the degree of convexity impossible.  Even so, there is considerable evidence of 
nonlinearity.  For example, Clark, Laxton, and Rose (1996) find strong evidence of nonlinearity 
for the United States for 1964 to 1990.   Laxton, Meredith, and Rose (1995) find evidence of 
nonlinearity using pooled G-7 data; and Mayes and Virén (2000) find nonlinearity for all EU 
countries except Spain, the Netherlands, and Finland.  Debelle and Laxton (1997) have taken the 
analysis of nonlinearity one step further.  For three countries, for the period 1971 to 1995, they 
have estimated the difference between the average historical rate of unemployment and the 
“deterministic NAIRU,” defined as the level of the unemployment rate consistent with 
nonaccelerating inflation in the absence of shocks.   These estimates are respectively 0.33 
                                                 
14 See Lipsey (1960), p. 13.  Lipsey also argues that, with such nonlinear relationships in each individual market, the 
dispersion of unemployment across markets will affect the level of wage change. 
 
15 Convexity of the short-run Phillips curve could reflect real, rather than nominal, wage rigidity.  However, with 
real, as opposed to nominal, wage rigidity, the coefficient on expected inflation should be unity, regardless of the 
inflation rate.    
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percentage points for the United States, 0.57 for the United Kingdom, and 0.86 for Canada.
16  
These estimates suggest that the volatility of output and unemployment has a nonnegligible 
effect on average unemployment (and output) via the nonlinearity of the short-run Phillips curve.   
A simple calculation confirms the reasonableness of Debelle and Laxton’s findings.  
Suppose we assume that π  depends on 1/u, consistent with Phillips’s and Lipsey’s functional 
form for the Phillips curve.  Taylor series expansion yields a formula that approximates the 
tradeoff between mean unemployment, u , and the volatility of unemployment, 
2
u σ , for a given 
deterministic NAIRU, u*.   








Usefully, this formula depends only on the functional form of the Phillips curve and is 
independent of any estimated coefficient.   Substituting the actual mean and standard deviation 
of U.S. unemployment for the period 1971-1995 for  and u u σ in (4), we estimate that the 
volatility in unemployment raised average unemployment by 0.23 percentage points, a result that 
is similar in magnitude to Debelle and Laxton’s estimate of 0.33 using an entirely different 
methodology based on a parametrically estimated Phillips curve. 
Such estimates surely overstate the decline in average unemployment due to nonlinearity 
that could result from further improvements in stabilization policy.  As Lucas notes, it is 
unrealistic to think that stabilization policy has the potential to eliminate all variability in 
unemployment.  However, the volatility of output and unemployment in the United States and 
numerous European countries has declined considerably since the 1980s—a phenomenon that 
has been dubbed the Great Moderation.  The formula (4) can also be used to estimate the 
                                                 
16 See Debelle and Laxton (1997), p. 260.   15
reduction in average unemployment resulting from the great moderation in the U.S.   Following 
Stock and Watson  (2003), we date the great moderation at 1984.  The standard deviation of U.S. 
unemployment declined from 1.74 to 1.07 between the periods 1960-1983 and 1984-2003, 
respectively.  Our formula suggests that the reduction in mean unemployment due to this 
reduction in volatility amounted to a nontrivial 0.31.  Of course, it is debatable just how much of 
this payoff was due to stabilization policy.  Stock and Watson attribute a substantial portion of 
the moderation to smaller shocks, that is, “good luck.”  In the view of some observers (Romer 
(1999), Bernanke (2004)), however, monetary policy probably deserves significant credit. 
In summary, the nonlinearity of the Phillips curve implies that successful stabilization 
policy reduces average unemployment.  These gains are not huge, but, then again, neither are 
they so very small.   
 
V.  Is the Accelerationist Hypothesis Always Valid? 
 
  The accelerationist Phillips curve depicts cyclical downturns and expansions as times 
when society stashes money in the bank and then draws its balance down.   During a cyclical 
downturn, inflation falls, and with it, inflationary expectations; lower inflationary expectations 
imply lower inflation at any unemployment rate in the future.  High unemployment during a 
downturn is thus an “investment” which permits lower unemployment in the future, for any 
given long-run inflation target.   Indeed, with both an accelerationist and linear Phillips curve, 
the investment pays a zero rate of return, since the tradeoff between unemployment in present 
and future periods is exactly one-for-one:  one extra point of unemployment now permits exactly 
one less point of unemployment later.  Section IV showed that this tradeoff is not quite one-for-
one if the short-run Phillips curve is nonlinear, even if it is accelerationist.   Section III argued   16
that, even with a tradeoff between unemployment now and unemployment later that is one- for-
one, social welfare may be higher with a smoother path of unemployment over time.   
  But it is also possible that the Phillips curve is not accelerationist.  There may not always 
and everywhere be a one-for-one add-on to current inflation as inflationary expectations rise.  If 
the add-on is less than unity, an economic downturn metaphorically puts money in the bank by 
lowering inflationary expectations and future inflation, but the return on the investment is 
negative.  In this case, an extra point of unemployment now reduces unemployment later by less 
than a point—a negative return.  If the accelerationist hypothesis is violated—which we consider 
especially likely when inflation is initially low—the returns to stabilization policy may be quite 
high.   
Indeed, the most persuasive critique of Lucas’s case against stabilization policy comes if 
the accelerationist hypothesis is violated.   In this section, we question the validity of the 
accelerationist hypothesis and present evidence suggesting that monetary policy can combat high 
unemployment at low initial inflation rates without curtailing the opportunity for low 
unemployment in later periods.  In the words of DeLong and Summers:
17 “…successful 
macroeconomic policies fill in troughs without shaving off peaks.”  If so, active stabilization 
policy—the use of monetary policy both to combat recession and aggressively contain 
inflation—will reduce average unemployment and raise average output.  In support of this view, 
we review cross-country evidence from the Great Depression and from the downturns afflicting a 
number of countries during the 1990s.  This evidence suggests that once inflation is low, 
inflation decelerates by much less in the face of high unemployment than is consistent with the 
accelerationist thesis.  If the failure to combat a prolonged recession does little to reduce inflation 
when it is already low, it creates little opportunity for a future, offsetting boom.    
                                                 
17 DeLong and Summers (1988), p. 434.   17
Theory.  Empirical research on the Phillips curve usually imposes the restriction that the 
impact of expected on actual inflation is point-for-point.   This restriction guarantees that the 
long-run equilibrium level of unemployment is independent of the rate of inflation:  the long-run 
Phillips curve is vertical.  Such an assumption seems reasonable if firms and workers are 
rational, in the sense that they base their decisions on real, not nominal, wages and relative 
prices, and inflation expectations ultimately mirror reality.   
However reasonable, the assumption that individual behavior depends on real, not 
nominal, magnitudes, is just that—an assumption.  Modelers routinely adopt this hypothesis not 
because the evidence in its favor is overwhelming, but rather because it is theoretically “correct” 
for rational agents to assess price and wage bargains in real terms.    
But, not everyone involved in price and wage setting may always think like an economist.  
If so, there is the possibility that the parameters of the Phillips curve vary depending upon 
circumstances.  For example, individuals might take inflationary expectations fully into account, 
even incorporating COLAs in contracts, when inflation is high enough to be salient, but not 
when inflation is low.  Under some conditions, people may suffer from money illusion.  Some 
employees may consider nominal wage cuts insulting or unfair, so that money wages may be 
sticky downwards.  If so, the degree of downward real wage rigidity rises as inflation declines, 
and the sacrifice ratio rises. 
While macroeconomic textbooks now all but universally assume an accelerationist 
Phillips curve, the basis for such a claim is surprisingly shaky.
18  Textbooks commonly point to 
the shifts that undoubtedly occurred in the Phillips curve as U.S. inflation rose in the 1960s and 
early 1970s as evidence of the accelerationist prediction that higher inflation raises inflationary 
                                                 
18  Fortin, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry provide an excellent survey (2002).  
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expectations, shifting the short-run Phillips curve upward.  Such behavior is “rational” so it 
seems logical to assume that it is universal.  However, when inflation is low and less salient, and 
wage setters are preoccupied with other problems, such as low sales, job loss, and the necessity 
of layoffs, they may approach wage and price decisions with a different mental frame than 
economists.  In these circumstances, the short-run Phillips curve may shift by less than one-for-
one with expected inflation.
19  Summarizing the macroeconomic evidence for a vertical long-run 
Phillips curve, Mankiw (2001) thus concludes that “…if one does not approach the data with a 
prior favoring long-run neutrality, one would not leave the data with that posterior. The data’s 
best guess is that monetary shocks leave permanent scars on the economy.”
20 
   The basic theoretical premise underlying the accelerationist Phillips curve is that the 
public and economists think about inflation in the same way.  Yet in surveys taken by Robert 
Shiller (1997), economists and the public indicated that they approach inflation with a very 
different mental frame, responding quite differently to a battery of questions concerning 
inflation.   The responses to two of Shiller’s questions provide examples of the extent to which 
economists’ views of inflation differ from those of the general public.  Most economists (90 
percent) disagree with the statement: “I think that if my pay went up I would feel more 
satisfaction in my job, more sense of fulfillment, even if prices went up just as much.”  Seventy-
seven percent of economists completely disagree with the statement and none fully agree.  In 
contrast, less than half (44 percent) of the public disagrees with the statement.  While only 27 
percent completely disagree, more than a quarter (28 percent) express full agreement (Shiller 
                                                 
19 The implications of downward nominal wage rigidity for the shape of the long-run Phillips curve have been 
explored by Tobin (1972) and Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996).   Karanassou, Sala, and Snower (2003) show that 
a significant long-run tradeoff can arise due to the interaction between time discounting and time-contingent 
nominal contracts even if all agents are rational and lack money illusion and there are no permanent nominal 
rigidities. 
 
20 Mankiw (2001), p. c48.   19
(1997, p. 37)).  Responses to another question provide further evidence of the distance between 
economists’ and the public’s respective mental frames concerning inflation:  Forty-nine percent 
of economists answered that their “biggest gripe about inflation” was that it “causes a lot of 
inconvenience,” and only 12 percent that it “hurt their real buying power.”  The public’s answers 
were massively reversed: only 7 percent named “inconvenience” as their “biggest gripe,” while a 
full 77 percent named their loss of “buying power” (Shiller, 1997, p. 29).  Shafir, Diamond, and 
Tversky (1997) similarly document substantial money illusion in survey responses.  They 
attribute pervasive money illusion to individuals’ psychological propensity to rely 
simultaneously on real and nominal mental frames for evaluation purposes.  Partial reliance on a 
nominal frame reflects the “ease, universality, and salience of the nominal representation.”
21   
  Such survey findings do not falsify the accelerationist hypothesis.   But they raise the 
question why, with so little examination, macroeconomists have assumed that the Phillips curve 
of necessity must take the accelerationist form.   They suggest instead that the validity of the 
accelerationist Phillips curve must be an empirical question. 
  In addition to survey evidence of money illusion, there is considerable microeconomic 
evidence that firms are reluctant to impose wage cuts on workers except in times of unusual 
duress for the firm.  Bewley (1999) interviewed employers in Connecticut who said they would 
not cut money wages for fear of harming morale, except in exceptional situations where the 
survival of the firm was at stake.  Similarly, surveys by Blinder and Choi (1990) and by 
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) report a strong negative relationship between work morale and 
wage cuts.  There is also much evidence--from papers using respectively different 
methodologies, samples, and countries--that wage changes pile up near zero when inflation is 
                                                 
21 Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997), p. 348.  Experimental evidence by Fehr and Tyran (2001) also shows the 
existence of money illusion.     20
low.  Such evidence has been reported by Card and Hyslop (1997), Kahn (1997), Lebow, Saks 
and Wilson (1999), and Altonji and Devereux (1999) for the United States, by Fortin (1996) for 
Canada, by Cassino (1995) and Chapple (1996) for New Zealand, by Dwyer and Leong (2000) 
for Australia, by Castellanos et al. (2004) for Mexico, by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, 2003b, 
2003c) and Kimura and Ueda (2001) for Japan, by Fehr and Goette (2003) for Switzerland, by 
Bauer et al. (2003) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) for Germany, by Nickell and Quintini 
(2001) for the United Kingdom, and by Agell and Lundborg (2003) for Sweden.   
  Downward nominal wage rigidity causes the accelerationist property of the Phillips curve 
to break down at sufficiently low inflation rates.  As inflation falls, the constraint on wage cuts 
impinges on increasing numbers of firms and employees.
22  The apparent ubiquity of downward 
nominal wage rigidity strongly suggests that the effect of expected inflation on wage and price 
bargains could become muted in times of sufficiently low inflation.  But, of course, the fact that 
wages sometimes do actually fall--as in the Great Depression when they fell a great deal--
suggests that wage rigidity is not absolute.  The behavior of wages in the Great Depression is 
consistent with Bewley’s finding that, in the downturn in Connecticut in the early 1990s, firms 
resisted wage cuts, but wages did give way in the presence of sufficient “financial distress.”  
Financial distress made workers far more accepting of wage cuts.
 23 
Macro Evidence.  We next examine cross-country macroeconomic data on the behavior 
of inflation in situations characterized by prolonged, abnormally high unemployment.  In our 
view, the evidence from such episodes is grossly inconsistent with the traditional accelerationist 
                                                 
22 The accelerationist property begins to break down as the average rate of money wage change approaches zero.  
The inflation rate at which this occurs declines point-for-point with the rate of productivity growth.   
 
23 See Bewley (1999), pp. 201-208.   
   21
hypothesis enshrined in modern macroeconomics textbooks.  According to that view, expected 
inflation feeds through point-for-point into actual inflation regardless of the initial level of 
inflation, and inflationary expectations are formed as an extrapolation (via a distributed lag) of 
recent inflation experience.  With a traditional Phillips curve, low unemployment drives actual 
inflation above expected inflation.  With actual inflation continually in excess of expected 
inflation, expected inflation must, in due course rise.  Since expected inflation is passed through 
into actual inflation one-for-one, actual inflation must also rise, so, over time, the price level 
accelerates.  Conversely, high unemployment causes inflation to fall short of expectations, 
producing ever lower inflation—i.e., accelerating deflation.  We shall see that most data from 
long economic downturns are inconsistent with such a model of wage, price, and expectations 
behavior.   
There is an alternative interpretation of the behavior of inflation during the long 
downturns we examine that is consistent with the accelerationist Phillips curve:  inflation 
expectations might not have been adaptive, reflecting an extrapolation of past inflation behavior.  
Instead, wage and price setters might have expected inflation (or the price level) to revert toward 
“normal,” explaining why inflation could remain stable or even rise in spite of substantial labor 
market slack.  This more sophisticated hypothesis is difficult to assay convincingly, but we shall 
offer some shreds of evidence suggesting that incomplete pass-through is a more plausible   
interpretation of wage and price behavior in long downturns.  An interesting issue for future 
research is to devise a test using macroeconomic data to identify the extent of inflation pass-
through in depressions, while allowing for the possibility of non-adaptive inflationary 
expectations.        22
We begin by considering a model in which inflationary expectations are adaptive.  In 
periods in which economic activity is depressed for a prolonged period, so that the 
unemployment rate is consistently above NAIRU, the systematic part of the driving force of the 
inflation process, which is  ( *) t f uu −−  in equation (2), is always negative.  As a result, if 
inflationary expectations are formed adaptively, as in standard non-rational expectations models, 
inflation will spiral downwards.   
This proposition is straightforward to show under simple assumptions and can also be 
generalized.   Suppose that the Phillips curve is of the standard accelerationist form assumed in 
(2):   
(6)   ( *)
e
tt t t fu u π πε =− − +  
Suppose also, for simplicity, that expected inflation is inflation in the previous period.   
(7)   1
e
tt π π − = .   
Then mere addition shows that the expected cumulative change in inflation from the beginning 
of a “depression”--a prolonged period of high unemployment--which we label time 0, to any 
later date n is the sum: 
(8)     0
1
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Equation (8) shows that in a “depression,” where ut significantly exceeds u* for an 
extended time, the expected value of the change in inflation is negative for all n (and all possible 
initial dates, 0).  The expected value of the cumulative change in inflation becomes increasingly 
negative as n increases.    The cumulative change in inflation also declines as n increases at a rate 
at least as large as f(umin- u*), where umin  is the minimum unemployment rate during the n 
periods.  Graphically, with an accelerationist Phillips curve, the expectation of the cumulative   23
change in inflation should lie in the shaded area in Figure 1.   The slope of the ray in Figure 1 is  
f(umin- u*).  This, of course, is the flip side of the accelerationist argument: with an 
accelerationist Phillips curve and adaptive expectations, low unemployment is expected to 
produce accelerating inflation.  But in a depression, the opposite occurs; high unemployment 
should produce decelerating inflation, ultimately deflation.  An accelerationist Phillips curve in 
a boom is a decelerationist Phillips curve in a depression. 
  Of course, the expectations process assumed in (7) lacks generality even with only 
adaptive expectations: it should be extended to the case in which expectations are a k-period, 
rather than a 1-period distributed lag of past inflation.  In this case, the expectation of a k-period 
distributed lag of n-period changes in inflation is ever-decreasing in n during periods in which 
the unemployment rate is continually in excess of the natural rate.
24 
  Accelerating Deflation in the Great Depression?  Our theorem suggests that a natural 
way to test the generality of the adaptive-expectations accelerationist hypothesis is to examine 
data on inflation during periods with prolonged high unemployment.   We begin with a look at 
the Great Depression, a period in which, partly due to linkages of countries through the gold 
standard,
25  unemployment rates rose in almost all countries around the globe and remained 
                                                 
24  For example, with two periods, with weights a and 1-a on periods one and two respectively, the formula 
becomes:  
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25 See Eichengreen (1992).   24
considerably above their respective natural rates for almost a decade.  Unemployment has never 
been anywhere near so high in any of the countries we consider either before or since, so it is 
clear that such joblessness could not be a simple aberration due to time-varying changes in the 
natural rate.  Appeal to time-varying NAIRU has been used to explain apparent violations of the 
natural rate hypothesis in other periods, but such an appeal cannot apply for the 1930s when the 
rates of unemployment were so extraordinarily high.    
Figure 2 summarizes evidence on the evolution of inflation during the Great Depression 
for twelve countries.  The solid line in each graph plots the annual inflation rate (the change in 
the CPI) for periods characterized by exceptionally high unemployment.  The bars show the 
cumulative (n-period) change in the rate of inflation from a starting date (1930 or 1931) near the 
beginning of the depression.    
The data reveal no evidence whatever in any country of declining inflation, even under 
conditions of massive unemployment.  Every country other than Denmark experienced deflation 
for a period at the outset of the 1930s.  The common pattern is one of rising inflation over time 
with positive inflation after 1933 or 1934.  The absence of a pattern of declining inflation 
appears to hold robustly, independent of start date.  
No f(  )  function, no matter how nonlinear, can explain why inflation declined so very 
little or not at all during the latter part of the 1930s if inflationary expectations are formed as a 
distributive lag of past inflations.  Unless there were massive shifts in the Phillips curve during 
this period, the data suggest that the coefficient on inflationary expectations was less than unity 
during the later part of the Depression.  Of course, those who believe that wages or prices might 
be sticky would not find such a conclusion surprising.   But such a conclusion is contrary to the 
microfoundations of the modern Phillips curve with adaptive expectations.   25
A potential criticism of our interpretation of these data is that eight or nine years is too 
short a period in which to expect accelerating deflation to materialize in the presence of long lags 
and stochastic shocks.   The period of the 1930s was also unique for other special reasons, such 
as the United States’ attempt to reflate through the National Recovery Act and its legislation to 
encourage unionization, which could mask a longer-term trend toward decelerating inflation.
26   
However, evidence for three countries (the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden) 
reveals no pattern of decelerating inflation even after 17 years of high unemployment.   These 
countries suffered from high unemployment continuously after 1921 because the Great 
Depression of the 1930s struck before they had fully recovered from the downturn of the 1920s.  
Figure 3 shows the behavior of annual and cumulative inflation after 1922.  In each country, we 
see a period of deflation following the onset of both downturns, but no tendency toward the 
cumulative and accelerating decline in inflation predicted by the accelerationist hypothesis with 
adaptive expectations.  Gordon and Wilcox (1981) have suggested that the data from the 
Depression roughly conform to a model in which inflation depends not on the level of the output 
gap but rather on the change in the output gap (or unemployment.)  Such a model seems to 
characterize the data in Figures 2 and 3.    
Decelerating Inflation during the Downturns of the 1990s?    Because the Great Depression 
is so special, it is useful to look for corroborative evidence from later periods.  Figure 4 presents 
data on the behavior of inflation for a number of OECD countries that experienced periods of 
prolonged unemployment in excess of their respectively estimated NAIRUs during the 1990s.  
The figure relies on OECD data and covers periods in which unemployment exceeded OECD 
                                                 
26  Bernanke (1995) notes that governments also intervened to prevent deflation in other countries, such as France.   
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estimates of the NAIRU.
 27  These recessions occurred in normal times, in the absence of an 
international gold standard.  Most of the countries operated under a flexible exchange rate 
regime.
28  The solid line shows the annual rate of inflation in the core CPI, while the bars again 
give the cumulative (n-period) change in inflation from an initial period in which unemployment 
exceeds NAIRU.   
The behavior of inflation, as measured by the change in the core CPI since the beginning of 
the respective downturn, is again largely inconsistent with the adaptive expectations 
accelerationist hypothesis.   Two countries—France and Sweden—exhibit a pattern of almost 
monotonically declining inflation and cumulatively declining n-period inflation, consistent with 
the accelerationist hypothesis.  In Japan, also consistent with the accelerationist theory, inflation 
did decline reasonably consistently after 1994.  Japan is the only country in which inflation 
actually turned negative.
29  However, deflation has not significantly intensified in Japan, in 
contradiction to the accelerationist hypothesis.  The remaining countries provide no evidence of 
consistently declining inflation in the face of high unemployment.  Instead, consistent with the 
hypothesis of downward nominal wage rigidity resulting in a failure of inflation to reflect 
changes in inflationary expectations on a one-for-one basis, the graphs (e.g., Canada, Finland, 
Switzerland) suggest a tendency for inflation to stabilize in the face of high unemployment once 
inflation has declined to a low positive level.    
The data in Figure 5 support the interpretation that downward nominal wage rigidity is to 
blame for the breakdown of the adaptive-expectations accelerationist hypothesis.  Figure 5 
                                                 
27 See OECD (2003, p. 31) for recent NAIRU estimates and Richardson et al. (2000). 
 
28 Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland had freely floating exchange rates throughout 
the period.  France was a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System.  
Finland joined the ERM in October 1996.    
 
29 The uptick in inflation in Japan in 1997 reflects an increase in the consumption tax.   27
presents data on various measures of wage inflation during the 1990s recessions for those 
countries for which the OECD maintains a wage series.  In the basic Phillips curve relationship, 
the one-for-one pass-through of expected inflation into actual inflation works via wage 
bargaining.  Patterns of wage inflation provide a cleaner test for one-for-one pass-through than 
patterns pertaining to price inflation, which depend on productivity developments and other 
supply factors, in addition to wages.   Figure 5 reveals no consistent tendency for wage inflation 
to decelerate in the face of excess unemployment.  The general pattern instead is for average 
wage changes to remain positive, roughly stabilizing at a low level.  The only country in which 
wages are observed to decline is Japan, where bonuses enhance downward wage flexibility.  
Other analysts have similarly rejected the accelerationist model based on tests using time-
series data.  Fair (2000) strongly rejects the accelerationist model for U.S. data by testing 
restrictions that the accelerationist hypothesis places on inflation dynamics.   Estimating the 
Phillips curve (in first difference form) Fair finds that changes in inflation depend on the lagged 
price level.  This suggests some form of money illusion: as if the current level of prices (and/or 
wages) puts a damper on the extent to which high unemployment will cause a reduction in 
inflation.
30 We have employed a slightly different strategy with a similar finding.  King and 
Watson (1994) present evidence of a long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, 
although they also find this tradeoff to be greater earlier than later in the late postwar period.
31 
Lundborg and Sacklén (2001) estimate a nonvertical long-run Phillips curve for Sweden.   
Brainard and Perry (2000) find that the coefficient on expected inflation in the Phillips curve 
varies inversely with inflation.   
                                                 
30 Fair (2000) p. 70. 
 
31 King and Watson (1994), p. 163.   28
The evidence strongly suggests that at times of low inflation and high unemployment, the 
coefficient on expected inflation in wage and price equations is less than unity as long as 
inflationary expectations are adaptively formed.  In this case, there is a long-run tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment at low inflation rates.    
Our reading of these pictures is in agreement with the judgment of others who have 
examined inflation data for the same period.  For example, in a recent assessment of inflation 
persistence in the euro area, the OECD concluded that “…it appears to be a generalized 
phenomenon that inflation has risen in countries with positive cumulative output gaps but has not 
fallen in those with negative cumulative gaps.  This feature of the data could reflect the presence 
of nominal rigidities that are hampering inflation adjustment in countries where activity is 
weak.”
 32  
An Alternative Interpretation of the Data.  While Figures 2 to 5 suggest that an 
accelerationist Phillips curve with adaptive expectations cannot explain inflation either during 
the Great Depression or during some prolonged downturns in the 1990s, there is another possible 
interpretation of the data.
33  Conceivably, inflation expectations during the Depression and these 
more recent long recessions reflect the view that the level of prices (and/or inflation) would 
eventually return to “normal.”  Since the absolute price level took a downward dive in the early 
1930s in virtually all countries, expected inflation could have been positive, rather than negative, 
thereafter.    
We should note, at least parenthetically, that such regressive expectations concerning the 
price level would not be rational for countries operating under the gold standard. The adjustment 
                                                 
32 OECD Economic Outlook 72, 2002, p. 163. 
 
33 Sargent (1971) long ago pointed out that the appropriate identifying restriction on the sum of coefficients on 
lagged inflation in the traditional Phillips curve should depend on the process by which inflation (and inflation 
expectations) was actually generated during the particular period being studied.      29
to a negative aggregate demand shock in the gold-standard countries required a decline in prices 
and wages until full employment had been restored.  With massive unemployment, the price 
level should have been expected to fall yet further.  But, one by one, countries were going off the 
gold standard in the 1930s, and the argument does make sense once governments have the scope 
to expand the money supply and reflate.
34  Regressive (or forward-looking) inflationary 
expectations might also account for the poor showing of the adaptive-expectations accelerationist 
Phillips curve during the long downturns of the 1990s, especially since by 1993, Australia, 
Canada, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden had all adopted explicit inflation targets, which 
might have anchored inflationary expectations.   The question thus remains whether, during the 
downturns we have examined, the failure of inflation to decline after reaching a low level reflects 
regressive expectations or, instead, the use of a nominal, rather than a real frame for setting 
prices and wages.   
Although a method might conceivably be developed to distinguish among these 
alternative interpretations based on macroeconomic data, our conjecture is that econometric tests 
using only data on wages and prices have very little power to discriminate between the two 
hypotheses.  This suggests that supplementary microeconomic information and independent, 
survey-based measures of inflationary expectations would be useful in settling the question.   
What evidence we do have from these two different types of sources, however, favors the 
hypothesis that once inflation is low, downward nominal wage rigidity mutes and truncates the 
pass-through of inflationary expectations.  We have already cited considerable evidence 
suggesting the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity generally.  In addition, O’Brien 
                                                 
 
34  France and Italy remained on the gold standard until 1936; Belgium and Switzerland remained until 1935.  The 
United States left the gold standard in 1933; Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
left the gold standard in 1931; Australia broke with gold in 1929.    30
(1989) and Hanes (2000) find that downward nominal wage rigidity was especially pervasive 
during the Great Depression, thus explaining our findings in Figures 2 and 3.   
   An alternative strategy to discern the difference between regressive expectations and 
incomplete pass-through relies on independent measures of inflationary expectations.  Akerlof, 
Dickens, and Perry (2000) estimated Phillips curves with survey measures of inflation 
expectations, rather than lagged inflation.  Consistent with our interpretation of the data, they 
find that the coefficient on expectations is close to unity when unemployment is low, but close to 
zero when unemployment is high.  This suggests incomplete pass-through rather than regressive 
expectations.  Although these findings are suggestive, they cannot be taken as conclusive.  In the 
case of downward nominal wage rigidity, there is no definitive way to go from the micro 
findings to the macroeconomic consequences.  And, the low pass-through coefficient estimated 
by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry could be the result of high measurement error of inflationary 





Both output stabilization and maintenance of price stability have been important policy 
priorities during the postwar period.  These dual policy goals are enshrined in the Federal 
Reserve Act and are widely accepted by both policymakers and the public as sensible and 
appropriate.  The decline in volatility of output and employment since the mid 1980s suggests 
that the Fed’s efforts have met with some success.   In his Presidential address to the American 
Economic Association, however, Robert Lucas argued that stabilization of output, even if 
possible, should not be a macroeconomic priority because the gains are trivially small.  
According to Lucas’s argument, stabilization policy has no impact on average consumption.  It   31
merely alters the timing of consumption, a variable whose aggregate fluctuations have been 
extremely modest.  Lucas’s argument rests on assumptions concerning the determinants of social 
welfare and the characteristics of the Phillips curve that are broadly endorsed by professional 
macroeconomists and incorporated in most macroeconomics textbooks.  Given the strong 
grounding of Lucas’s conclusion in standard theory, our objective has been to reconsider the 
economic logic of stabilization policy.   
This paper surveyed a growing literature questioning key assumptions underlying Lucas’s 
conclusion.  Based on this survey and our own suggestive evidence, we conclude that there is a 
solid case for stabilization policy and that there are especially strong reasons for central banks to 
accord it priority in the current era of low inflation.   The evidence suggests that stabilization 
policy can produce non-negligible gains in welfare.  With a nonlinear short-run Phillips curve, 
stabilization policy reduces average levels of joblessness and raises average output by a 
nontrivial amount.  Stabilization policy also raises social welfare if, as seems likely, welfare 
deteriorates nonlinearly with increases in unemployment.  A nonlinear relationship between 
unemployment and social welfare may reflect the increasing incidence of long-duration 
unemployment spells as aggregate unemployment rises, the diminishing benefits associated with 
additional job creation as unemployment falls, or correlations between idiosyncratic risks and 
aggregate risks that result in large losses for low-income, liquidity-constrained households as a 
result of the business cycle.    
A Phillips curve that is not always accelerationist provides a further, important reason for 
central banks to pursue stabilization as an objective.   The now-traditional accelerationist Phillips 
curve captures two elementary truths about the nature of inflation.  First, when product and labor 
markets are tight, as typically occurs when unemployment is low, prices and wages both tend to   32
increase.   This corresponds to the simplest notion of supply and demand: if unemployment is 
sufficiently low, the demand for labor exceeds supply, and it would be highly surprising if wages 
did not rise to close the gap.  Higher inflationary expectations should similarly raise labor 
demand and reduce labor supply, pushing wage and price inflation higher.    
But the accelerationist Phillips curve is much more specific and goes further, stating that 
the impact of inflationary expectations on inflation is exactly point-for-point at all times and in 
all phases of the business cycle.  Such a conclusion would be justified theoretically if all parties 
affected by wage and price decisions thought exactly like economists.  But the assumption that 
everybody in the economy thinks about prices and wages in the same real terms as economists is 
a strong one, and available research we have reviewed suggests that under many circumstances 
this assumption is violated.  The most solid evidence of a violation comes from considerable 
cross-country evidence revealing a spike in the distribution of money wage changes at zero, with 
the spike becoming larger as inflation declines.  Questionnaires similarly suggest that economists 
and the public do not answer questions about inflation in the same way.  We also argue that the 
behavior of inflation during long periods with extensive labor market slack, such as the Great 
Depression and the downturns afflicting numerous countries during the 1990s, appears 
inconsistent with the accelerationist hypothesis.  The macroeconomic evidence instead suggests a 
diminished tendency for inflation to decline in the face of high unemployment—that is, a higher 
sacrifice ratio—due to lower pass-through of inflationary expectations into inflation once 
inflation is already low, as it now is throughout the industrialized world.  This violation of the 
accelerationist hypothesis is a logical consequence of downward nominal wage rigidity.    
  Since the gains from stabilization policy depend largely on the nature of the inflation 
process—whether it is linear or nonlinear and whether it is accelerationist or not—we suggest   33
policymakers should be cautious about embracing inflation forecasts derived from theoretical 
models embodying overly strong priors.  A cautious approach is also dictated by the fact that the 
fit of the Phillips curve for many countries and time periods is extremely loose.
35  Such a poor fit 
of accelerationist Phillips curves, even allowing for a time-varying NAIRU, strengthens the case 
for forecasts of inflation that are independent of natural rate theory and policy strategies that 
explicitly recognize the uncertainty attached to these forecasts.  Indeed, the success of the 
Federal Reserve in the late 1990s in reducing unemployment and inflation simultaneously was 
arguably a consequence both of the Fed’s commitment to dual policy goals and its empirically 
oriented and open-minded approach toward forecasting inflation.   
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Table 1.   The Impact of Aggregate Unemployment on Alternative Measures of Long-




Change in the 
fraction 
unemployed at 
least:  Constant 
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Australia  6 months  -0.0008 
(0.0034) 
 0.53** 
(0.31)  0.51  1979-
2002 
  One year   0.0029 
(0.0074) 
 1.55* 
(0.66)  0.16  1979-
2002 
Canada  6 months  -0.001 
(0.0018) 
 1.25** 
(0.18)  0.66  1977-
2002 
  One year   0.019 
(0.003) 
 0.87** 
(0.30)  0.23  1977-
2002 





(0.43)  -0.04  1976-
2002 
  One year   0.004 
(0.006) 
 0.75 
(0.81)  -0.005  1976-
2002 
Japan  6 months  -0.0005 
(0.004) 
 1.38 
(1.3)  0.005  1978-
2002 
  One year   0.005 
(0.004) 
 2.09 
(1.13)  0.09  1978-
2002 
Sweden  6 months   0.0001 
(0.002) 
 1.24** 
(0.21)  0.64  1979-
2002 
United States  6 months   0.0014 
(0.0016) 
 1.70** 
(0.17)  0.76  1971-
2002 
 
One year   0.0017 
(0.0033) 
 0.88* 
(0.34)  0.15  1971-
2002 
 
Source:  Authors’ computations based on OECD Labor Force Statistics Database.   
a Dependent variable is the change in the number of individuals unemployed at least 6 months (one year) as a 
fraction of the total number unemployed.  Unemployment rate is total number unemployed as a fraction of the 
labor force.  Standard errors in parentheses.   41 
Figure 1.  Implications of the Accelerationist Phillips Curve for the Cumulative  
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Source: Global Financial Database.  Consumer prices based on official government data 
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Source:  OECD, Main Economic Indicators 
a Inflation measured as the percentage increase in the consumer price index, excluding 
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